About KeyLynk

Built by an operator drowning in API keys. For everyone who is too.

We didn't design KeyLynk in a product meeting. We built it because the team building it was drowning in the exact problem it solves.

It started because one person couldn't keep track

KeyLynk began with a founder, Jose Aponte, and an automation stack that had quietly gotten out of hand. Running it daily meant living inside a sprawl of credentials — OpenRouter keys, GitHub tokens, Telegram bot tokens, Google OAuth secrets, Hostinger SSH keys, n8n instance tokens — managed the way most solo builders manage them: .env files, notes apps, copy-paste rituals, the occasional “where did I put that?” moment. By the time anyone counted, there were thirty-one. For a stack running sensitive automation every day, that's not inconvenient. It's a liability. And the person carrying it wasn't a security team — it was one operator and a coordinated network of AI agents (Claude, Antigravity, AgentZero, Hermes, and Space Agent) doing the actual work.

So we built a vault. For ourselves.

The first version was built fast and built right: AES-256-GCM encryption, PBKDF2 key derivation at 100,000 iterations, a store that never touched the network unencrypted. Not the easiest choices — the ones that mattered. Then came a clean, keyboard-driven interface, and a one-click n8n provisioner that pushed vault secrets straight into a workflow with no copy-paste and no Enterprise plan required. Thirty-one real credentials loaded. In daily use, on real work.

Then we asked who else has this problem

The research was stark. AI-service credential leaks surged sharply year over year — OpenRouter keys, OpenAI keys, Anthropic keys are exactly the category we were already protecting. Every existing secrets manager — Doppler, Infisical, HashiCorp Vault — is built for developers shipping applications through CI/CD. They assume you know what a container is. They assume your “secret” is a connection string going into a Kubernetes deployment.

None of them are built for the person running fifteen n8n workflows that call Claude, Stripe, Slack, and Google Sheets — who has never opened a terminal. And n8n's own official external-secrets integration, the feature that would actually solve this, is locked behind its Enterprise tier. Hundreds of thousands of automation builders on free, starter, and pro plans are left pasting live keys directly into workflow nodes. We'd already solved our own version of that problem. We just hadn't told anyone it existed.

We are the customer — literally

The founder lives with the same credential sprawl every solo automation builder does, and the agents that run the stack depend on those keys staying safe. That's not a marketing angle — it's the founding condition of the product. KeyLynk protects the credentials our own work depends on before it protects anyone else's. We didn't build it to sell security software — we built it so we could keep building.

What we optimize for

Four things we won't trade away as the product grows.

Zero-knowledge is non-negotiable

If a design choice would let our servers read your secrets, we don't ship it. Not a policy — a cryptographic guarantee enforced by the architecture.

Built for people who've never opened a terminal

Every other option in this category assumes CLI comfort and DevOps context. We're building for the person running fifteen n8n workflows who has never needed either.

We don't publish a claim before it's true

We've held our own copy back before because a feature was spec'd but not yet working end to end. If something on this site describes what KeyLynk does, it's because we checked, not because it sounded right.

We are the first customer

KeyLynk protects the same credentials our own team runs on every day. If it broke, we'd feel it before you would.

Read the architecture, not just the pitch

The security page covers exactly how the zero-knowledge model works, credential by credential.